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Abstract: Twelve to thirty-six months after a major hurricane, bankruptcy filing
rates increase for affected areas. The Article draws that conclusion by examining all
eighteen hurricanes that hit the fifty United States between 1980 and 2004 and that
caused $1 billion or more in damages. Despite substantial limitations in the data
that would obscure all but the strongest relationships, distinct patterns emerge.
Although further empirical analyses should be done, these findings suggest that Con-
gress should except victims of hurricanes and other natural disasters from recent
legislation that will make it more difficult to get bankruptcy relief Because higher
bankruptcy filing rates can be a seen as a symptom of financial distress, this Article
also suggests other ideas for legislative relief including both temporary moratoria
on debt collections and adverse credit reporting and more permanent relief such as
mandatory debtor-creditor mediation before a creditor could get a court judgment
against hurricane victims.
INTRODUCTION
Many persons who survived Hurricane Katrina's devastation in August
2005 were left without homes, without jobs, and without most of the assets they
had accumulated over a lifetime. Although their financial resources were gone,
past debts remained, and new obligations arrived. Hurricane Katrina's victims
had to pay for housing, food, transportation, health care, and all of the other
expenses necessary to sustain themselves. While trying to build a new life,
Hurricane Katrina's victims still had to contend with the obligations of a previ-
ous one.
Within days of the hurricane, members of Congress had proposed amend-
ments1 to the federal bankruptcy law that would except those financially devas-
tated by Hurricane Katrina from the harsh provisions of the recently enacted
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
* Gordon & Silver, Ltd., Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank the participants at a faculty workshop at the Boyd School of
Law for their helpful comments. Also, Ann Casey, Jennifer Gross, and Julia Rhyne provided
superb research assistance. Any errors, of course, are my responsibility.
' H.R. 3662, 109th Cong. (2005) (delaying the effective date of the new bankruptcy law by
two years); H.R. 3697, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing permanent exceptions in the bank-
ruptcy laws for victims of natural disasters); S. 1647, 109th Cong. (2005) (also proposing
permanent changes in the bankruptcy laws for victims of natural disasters). The contents of
H.R. 3697 are detailed in the Press Release of Representative Jerrold Nadler. Nadler, Cony-
ers, Watt, Jackson Lee to Introduce Bill to Relieve Debt Burden on Katrina Survivors (Sept.
1, 2005), http://www.house.gov/appslist/press/ny08_nadler/DebtreliefKatrinaO90105.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
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("BAPCPA").2 Defenders of the new statute responded the amendments were
unnecessary because BAPCPA prevented only abusive bankruptcy filings.3
Both sides of the debate assume the answer to an underlying empirical
question about how people use the bankruptcy system. Those who would
amend the law to protect Katrina's victims assume that the bankruptcy system
helps to provide relief from the financial devastation that follows a hurricane.
It is plausible that hurricanes wreak such awful damage that those affected by a
hurricane need fundamental financial help beyond what the bankruptcy system
can provide, and hence hurricane victims do not turn to the bankruptcy courts.
On the other hand, those who defend restrictions on bankruptcy relief assume a
consumer's decision to file often is not a reaction to real financial distress and
reflects nothing more than a personal preference to abandon one's obligations.
Under this view, exogenous economic shocks do not dramatically affect bank-
ruptcy filing rates, and hence there is little need to amend the bankruptcy laws
in the wake of a disaster.
This Article examines the effects on bankruptcy filing rates from all eigh-
teen hurricanes that hit the United States between 1980 and 2004 and caused
more than $1 billion in damages. 4 Filing rates increase in federal judicial dis-
tricts and states most affected by these hurricanes, especially in the period
twelve to thirty-six months after the hurricane. The number of observations is
low, making these conclusions tentative. In the months and years ahead, more
exhaustive scholarly analyses may and should follow, but those analyses will
come too late to inform the debate about what legal relief should be given to
Hurricane Katrina's victims. The goal of this Article is to provide some data
for the short-term decisions that must be made as well as to provide a starting
point for future studies.
Part I of this Article provides a short review of the existing literature about
the effects of natural disasters on bankruptcy filing rates specifically and on
consumers generally. Part II then explores the data for bankruptcy filing rates
after previous catastrophic hurricanes and finds a pattern of increased bank-
ruptcy filings. The few exceptions occurred where the largest average flood
insurance claims had been paid, suggesting the exceptions happen when hurri-
canes strike relatively wealthier areas. The data reinforce the common-sense
intuition that catastrophic natural disasters cause financial distress to their sur-
vivors. Finally, Part III of the Article concludes with some recommendations
for changes to the bankruptcy law and other federal laws to help the survivors
of hurricanes and other natural disasters.
2 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
3 Susan Cornwell, US Dems Urge Easing of Bankruptcy for Katrina Victims, WASH. POST,
Sept. 1, 2005 (on file with NEVADA LAW JOURNAL), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/01/ (quoting aide to Rep. James Sensenbrenner as claiming the
new bankruptcy law did not need amending because it only cracked down on those who
abused the system). Previously, Representative Sensenbrenner had defended the statute as
"restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system" and contrasted
bankruptcy filers with "those of us who pay our bills." 147 Cong. Rec. H517 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 2001).
4 Two of the storms actually were denominated tropical storms but, for ease of exposition,
the term "hurricane" will be used throughout this article.
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I. PRIOR LITERATURE
The academic literature on the financial consequences of hurricanes prin-
cipally agrees upon one thing: Hurricanes are complex economic events. It is
difficult to specify econometric models that isolate the effects of hurricanes
from other events that may be affecting a local economy such as regional or
seasonal business cycles. In fact, some commentators will offer the trite analy-
sis that hurricanes create an economic boom by pumping federal aid and con-
struction money into affected areas. 5 The reality is much more complex.
To be sure, studies find short-tem increases in economic activity once the
immediate physical destruction and dislocation of a hurricane abates.6 Over the
long term, however, financial losses offset these short term gains. Indeed, the
short-term economic gains may consist principally of accelerated repairs and
investment that would have been made even in the absence of the hurricane.
As long as three years after the hurricane, there can be a negative economic
aftershock as purchasing slows.7 These previous findings suggest that
increases in bankruptcy filing rates might be at their strongest several years
after the hurricane.
Because the prior studies looked at the broader economic effects of a hur-
ricane, they do not necessarily tell us much about what happens to bankruptcy
filing rates. Economic effects averaged across a region mask the effects on
particular individuals. To the extent a hurricane might leave some as economic
winners-or at least economic "break evens"-it will leave others as economic
losers. Rather than tell the story of the average, bankruptcy filing rates help to
tell the story of the economic misfortune spread by a hurricane.
For a column in a monthly professional newsletter, Ed Flynn looked spe-
cifically at the effect of natural disasters on bankruptcy filing rates.8 Flynn's
analysis consists only of overlaying changes in the quarterly bankruptcy filing
rate for particular judicial districts over change in the national quarterly filing
rate. After simply eyeballing a series of line and bar graphs, Flynn concludes
that bankruptcy filings for a judicial district or state follow the same pattern
both before and after a natural disaster.9
Flynn's article does not purport to be a serious statistical study of the
issue, and there are several reasons why his conclusion is not persuasive. First,
many of his graphs show that areas hit by natural disasters have higher filing
I This analysis is often offered in the wake of a hurricane. For example, J Antonio Villamil,
chairman of Florida Governor Jeb Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, said the 2004
hurricane season would "be a temporary jolt" to the Florida economy and continued, "We're
going to experience a boom in new construction and repairs and road building. We're
already seeing people being re-employed in reconstruction." Joseph B. Treaster, Officials
Forecast Hope for Victims of Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at 1.12.
6 See Paulo Guimaraes, Frank L. Hefner & Douglas P. Woodward, Wealth and Income
Effects of Natural Disasters: An Econometric Analysis of Hurricane Hugo, 23 REV.
REGIONAL STUD. 97, 98 (1993); David G. Lenze, Dynamic and Spatial Impact of Hurricane
Andrew on Florida's Taxable Sales: An Intervention Analysis, 27 REV. REGIONAL STUD.
163, 163-64 (1997).
7 See Guimares, Hefner & Woodward, supra note 6, at 107; Lenze, supra note 6, at 179.
8 Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy and Natural Disasters, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (Jan. 2005).
9 See id. at 76.
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rates than the national average two or more years after the natural disaster,
precisely when the prior economic literature would predict. In drawing his
conclusion, Flynn looked for very short-term spikes in filings; specifically,
Flynn looked at filing rates in the quarters immediately following the natural
disaster. Also, by using the national filing rate as the basis for comparison with
each locally affected district, Flynn includes areas that may have been affected
by the natural disaster he is measuring. His base rate for comparison is dis-
torted by the precise effect he is trying to observe. Finally, Flynn looks only at
six natural disasters without an adequate explanation of why he chose those six
particular natural disasters.' ° Indeed, by choosing to include the Midwest
floods of 1993, Flynn contradicts his claim that he chose disasters that did "a
great deal of damage to a state or particular judicial district rather than those
with an impact that was spread through an entire region."" What happens to
bankruptcy filing rates after a hurricane remains very much an open question to
which the next section turns.
II. FILING RATES AFTER PAST HURRICANES
Because the current Bankruptcy Code went into effect on October 1, 1979,
and was such a dramatic change from prior law, the year 1980 is a useful begin-
ning point to study the effects of hurricanes on filing rates. Throughout this
analysis, data for total bankruptcy filing rates are used because my own recent
work finds that the reliability of the distinction between business and consumer
filings has deteriorated over time, and this distinction is essentially meaning-
less. ' 2 In any event, if the point is to measure the financial distress following a
hurricane, both consumer and business bankruptcies are relevant.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") identi-
fies eighteen hurricanes that made landfall in the United States between 1980
and 2004 and caused at least $1 billion in damages.' 3 Storms that cause $1
billion in damages should be large enough to cause widespread financial dis-
tress. Table 1 arranges these storms in chronological order and states their
location of landfall.
10 Flynn looks at Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco earthquake of 1989, Hurricane
Andrew, the Midwest floods of 1993, the Red River floods of 1997, and Hurricane Floyd.
See id. at 20, 76.
" See id. at 20. After the Midwest floods, 404 counties in nine states were declared federal
disaster areas, making it difficult to characterize these floods as localized in effect. See Neal
Lott, The Summer of 1993: Flooding in the Midwest and Drought in the Southeast, National
Climatic Data Center paper (September 2003), http://ols.nndc.noaa.gov/plolstore/plsqlU
olstore.prodspecific?prodnum=C00487-PUB-AOOOI (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
12 Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bank-
ruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 745, 793 (2005).
13 See Tom Ross & Neal Lott, A Climatology of 1980-2003 Extreme Weather and Climate
Events, Technical Report 2003-01 for the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (2003),
http://wwwl.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/techrpts/tr2003Ol/tr2OO3-Ol.pdf (last visited Sept. 3,
2005).
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BILLION-DOLLAR HURRICANES AND TROPICAL STORMS
IN THE FIF-ry UNITED STATES, 1980-2004
Table 1
Storm Name Landfall
Hurricane Alicia Galveston, TX
Hurricane Elena Biloxi, MS
Hurricane Juan Morgan City, LA
Hurricane Hugo Charleston, SC
Hurricane Bob Newport, RI
Hurricane Andrew Dade County, FL
Hurricane Iniki Kauai, HI
Trop. Storm Alberto Destin, FL
Hurricane Opal Pensacola, FL
Hurricane Fran Cape Fear, NC
Hurricane Bonnie Wilmington, NC
Hurricane Floyd Cape Fear, NC
Trop. Storm Allison Galveston, TX
Hurricane Isabel Drum Inlet, NC
Hurricane Charley Cayo Costa, FL
Hurricane Frances Hutchinson Islan
Hurricane Jeanne 14  Hutchinson Islan
Hurricane Ivan Gulf Shores, AL
source: National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
d, FL
d, FL
Date
Aug. 1983
Sept. 1985
Oct. 1985
Sept. 1989
Aug. 1991
Aug. 1992
Sept. 1992
Jul. 1994
Oct. 1995
Sept. 1996
Aug. 1998
Sept. 1999
June 2001
Sept. 2003
Aug. 2004
Sept. 2004
Sept. 2004
Sept. 2004
To measure bankruptcy filing rates, the Administrative Office of United
States Courts' official statistics were used. Statistics were compiled on an
annual basis for the twelve-month period ending June 30 of each year. The
Census Bureau's annual population estimates as of July 1 of each year were
then used to compute annual filing rates. Bankruptcy filing statistics were
compiled at both the federal judicial district and state level. All other data in
this paper are publicly available, government data.
District- and state-level bankruptcy filing rates are fairly blunt statistical
tools. Localized effects on bankruptcy filing rates could easily disappear once
the rates were aggregated across a broad geographic area. Two previous stud-
ies found localized economic effects from Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane
Andrew, but once the data were aggregated across a state, these effects could
not be isolated. 1 5 These studies measured average economic gains and losses
and by no means precluded the possibility that more individuals would show up
in bankruptcy court after a hurricane. Still, with a small number of observa-
tions and with such broadly aggregated data, it seemed unlikely the available
data would show much change in bankruptcy filing rates after a hurricane.
Only the strongest patterns in the data would show anything meaningful.
In fact, Figure 1 shows a distinct pattern where bankruptcy filing rates
generally rise in the years after a major hurricane. Figure 1 compares the aver-
'4 Although alphabetically coming after Ivan, Jeanne did make landfall before Ivan.
15 See Guimares, Hefner & Woodward, supra note 6, at 113 n.8; Lenze, supra note 6, at
174-76.
h
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AVERAGE INCREASE IN STATE FILING RATES,
LANDFALL STATE VERSUS UNAFFECTED STATES
Figure 1
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Sources: Administrative Of fice of the United States Courts, U.S. Census Bureau
age increase in filing rates for twelve, twenty-four, and thirty-six month periods
following the hurricane.16 The different bars represent (1) the state NOAA
6 Because the bankruptcy filing data are not available on a monthly basis, the filing rates
actually represent the twelve-month period ending June 30 that encompasses each hurricane
and the next two twelve-month intervals. Stated alternatively, for Hurricane Alicia, which
occurred in August 1983, the filing rates are for the twelve-month period ended June 30,
1984, the twenty-four month period ended June 30, 1985, and the thirty-six month period
ended June 30, 1986. The one exception is for Tropical Storm Allison, which occurred in
I
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identified as the landfall state, (2) other states NOAA identified as affected by
the hurricane, and (3) all remaining states.
Because bankruptcy filings have steadily risen through the past twenty-
five years, 17 any comparison of filing rates over time will show an upward
trend. It is the relative differences in Figure 1 that are important. States prima-
rily affected by hurricanes have an average increase in filing rates that is
around fifty percent larger than the increase in unaffected states: For every two
new filings in an unaffected state, there are three new filings in the landfall
state. Also, landfall states experience a higher increase than states less directly
affected by the hurricane, a logical relationship that reinforces the idea that the
data reflect real differences among the states. Interestingly, the biggest
increases are seen twenty-four and thirty-six months after the hurricane, a find-
ing consistent with the time period where the economic literature found linger-
ing effects.
Averages can always mask individual variation. Therefore, Table 2 arrays
the thirteen storms for which there are three years of data in order of the thirty-
six month difference in the bankruptcy filing rate between the landfall state and
unaffected states. Table 2 also presents the average flood insurance claim paid
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA").' 8 Bankruptcy fil-
ing rates are generally higher for states where the hurricane made landfall,
DIFFERENCE IN BANKRUPTCY FILING RATE
BETWEEN LANDFALL STATE & UNAFFECTED STATES
Table 2
Average Flood
Claim Paid 12 24 36
Hurricane Landfall State (2001 dollars) Months Months Months
Elena Mississippi $16,183 22.1% 51.4% 71.8%
Alicia Texas $20,182 13.5% 29.2% 66.8%
Iniki Hawaii (< 1,500 claims) 25.9% 34.3% 50.4%
Juan Louisiana $24,745 22.3% 40.2% 27.7%
Bonnie North Carolina $9,646 1.2% 8.3% 14.6%
Bob Rhode Island $22,976 13.1% 19.2% 14.3%
TS Allison Texas $36,163 3.0% 7.6% 12.7%
Floyd North Carolina $25,079 -0.3% 5.5% 12.6%
Fran North Carolina $24,401 2.2% -5.0% -3.8%
Hugo South Carolina $41,941 -12.8% -0.2% -5.4%
Andrew Florida $39,102 -3.6% -6.7% -8.1%
Opal Florida $46,852 -5.2% -8.0% -8.6%
TS Alberto Florida (< 1,500 claims) -1.6% -7.7% -11.0%
sources: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts,
Census Bureau
June 2001 and for which the data represent a full twelve-month period beginning on June 30,
2002, and every twelve months thereafter.
"7 Lawless & Warren, supra note 12, at 751 tbl. 1.
18 Flood insurance claims for flood events with 1,500 or more claims are collected at Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program-Significant
Flood Events, http://www.fema.gov/nfip/signl000.shtm (last visited September 3, 2005).
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again especially twenty-four and thirty-six months after the hurricane. Three of
the hurricanes after which bankruptcy filing rates actually decreased, and
defied the overall pattern, were in the state of Florida, suggesting that perhaps
the declines stem from some characteristic unique to that state.
The average FEMA flood insurance claim provides some sense of the rela-
tive average value of property destroyed by the hurricane. The average flood
claim paid for the seven hurricanes after which bankruptcy filings increased
most was $19,802. By comparison, the average flood claim paid for the hurri-
canes after which bankruptcy filings increased least, or even decreased, was
$37,692. These amounts are stated in 2001 dollars, and the difference is statis-
tically meaningful (t = 4.125, p = 0.003). In contrast, the number of FEMA
flood insurance claims did not display any clear pattern. Taken together, these
statistics suggest that the bankruptcy filing rates do not depend on the scope of
the hurricanes' destruction (i.e., the number of flood claims) but what the hurri-
canes destroyed (i.e., the average value of the flood claims). Poorer areas hit
by a hurricane experience more bankruptcy filings than do wealthier areas, a
finding that future research especially should explore.
To check the robustness of the state-level results, I compared total bank-
ruptcy filings between federal judicial districts. Each federal judicial district in
which a particular hurricane made landfall was matched with a judicial district
that was unaffected by any hurricane for the thirty-six month period following
the hurricane in question. Matches were based on simple correlation coeffi-
cients for bankruptcy filing rates, eliminating duplicates. Thus, the matching
produced a control sample of judicial districts that were unaffected by a hurri-
cane but where bankruptcy filings historically most closely followed the pat-
terns of the judicial districts where hurricanes had made landfall.
The results of the control sample analysis again showed that the landfall
districts had higher bankruptcy filing rates from twelve to thirty-six months
after the hurricane than did the unaffected districts. Twenty-four months after
the hurricane, bankruptcy filings had increased 16.4% more in the landfall dis-
tricts than in the control sample. Thirty-six months after the hurricane, bank-
ruptcy filing rates had increased 25.7% more in the landfall districts than in the
control sample. There are only fourteen judicial districts for which twenty-four
month data are available (thirteen for the thirty-six month data). Given the
small number of observations, it was not surprising that the differences were
not statistically significant using simple t-tests. Nonetheless, it was important
that the control sample analysis at the judicial district level confirmed the gen-
eral pattern that had emerged at the state level.
Taken together, the available data indicate that areas affected by a major
hurricane experience a marked increase in bankruptcy filing rates twelve to
thirty-six months after the hurricane. Given that the data are basic state and
judicial-district level filing rates and that the number of observations is few, it
is remarkable that such a distinct pattern emerges. The data also suggest there
is some relationship between the value of the property destroyed, measured by
the value of FEMA flood insurance claims, and increased bankruptcy filings.
Figures were adjusted to 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Con-
sumers (CPI-U).
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Relatively poorer areas experience a greater increase in bankruptcy filings than
do wealthier areas.
The phrase "available data" should be emphasized. Certainly, more
sophisticated and larger studies should be done. One obvious extension of the
work here would be to look at natural disasters other than hurricanes as well as
disasters under the $1 billion threshold. The findings in this Article, however,
confirm the common-sense intuition that areas hit by major hurricanes will suf-
fer great financial distress and that distress will linger long after the media glare
has disappeared. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, legislators should con-
sider changes to legal rules that could ease the financial distress for its victims
and victims of future natural disasters. The next section considers what those
changes might be.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Federal and state disaster aid may be the most effective assistance that
survivors of a hurricane can receive. At the same time, legislators could also
amend various statutory regimes so that these regimes account for the special
needs of hurricane victims. This section will discuss possible changes to fed-
eral law, although states could also make changes to their own parallel statutory
regimes where appropriate. Also, although this paper focuses on hurricanes, it
is not a very large logical leap to conclude that these legislative proposals
would benefit victims of natural disasters similar in geographic scope and
destructive power.
The core finding of this Article is that hurricane survivors appear to turn to
the bankruptcy courts for relief. Hurricane Katrina struck approximately seven
weeks before the October 17, 2005, effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"). 9 Given that the spike
in bankruptcy filings does not occur until twelve to thirty-six months after the
hurricane, those who will need to use the bankruptcy courts as a result of Hurri-
cane Katrina will have to deal with this new law. Of course, BAPCPA will
also be in place for victims of future natural disasters.
Regardless of how one felt about the merits of BAPCPA, it is difficult to
characterize the intent behind the statute as anything but intent to reduce the
number of bankruptcy filings. 20 The evidence discussed in Part II suggests that
hurricane victims turn to the bankruptcy courts to alleviate the financial distress
that follows in the wake of natural disaster. This evidence undercuts the notion
that rising bankruptcy filing rates are due to consumer abuse rather than reac-
tions to real financial problems. Because of BAPCPA, Hurricane Katrina's
19 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
20 Supporters of BAPCPA continually cited the rising number of bankruptcy filings as evi-
dence alone that the law was necessary, logical reasoning that implicitly promised the new
law would reduce filings. See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. E704 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (state-
ment of Rep. Moore); 150 Cong. Rec. H143 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sessions); 149 Cong. Rec. H1995 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte);
146 Cong. Rec. S5383 (daily ed. June 20, 2000) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Of course, if
one believed the bankruptcy courts were clogged with abusive filings, then the solution
would necessarily entail a reduction in filings.
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victims would find the bankruptcy courts less accessible than previous victims
of natural disasters. A delay in the implementation date of BAPCPA for thirty-
six months would have preserved accessibility to the bankruptcy courts for
Hurricane Katrina's victims. However, such a delay never happened, an unsur-
prising result given the strong credit industry support for the legislation's pas-
sage just five months prior to Hurricane Katrina 2 ' and the unwillingness of the
bill's managers to consider even the most modest amendments.2 2
In the future, a more politically palatable solution might be to excuse areas
affected by a particular hurricane from BACPA's most onerous requirements.
However, some might contend that such a solution might run afoul of the con-
stitutional requirement for geographic uniformity in the nation's bankruptcy
laws. 23 Notably, though, the requirement of geographic uniformity is not abso-
lute. In Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corporations,2 4 the
Supreme Court held the Regional Rail Reorganization Act did not violate the
uniformity requirement although it provided for reorganization of railroads
only in parts of the northeastern and midwestern United States. The Court said
that although the uniformity argument
has a certain surface appeal ... [it] is without merit because it overlooks the flexibil-
ity inherent in the constitutional provision ...
The uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take into account differ-
ences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to
resolve geographically isolated problems. "The problem dealt with [under the Bank-
ruptcy Clause] may present significant variations in different parts of the country."
We therefore agree with the Special Court that the uniformity clause was not
intended "to hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with
conditions calling for remedy only in certain regions."
25
21 See Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors,
Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J. L. EcON. & ORG.
527, 553 (2004) ("We have found striking evidence of the importance of both ideology and
interest group interventions in the formation of legislation. While the importance of ideol-
ogy is generally accepted, it is rare to find such clear evidence of the effects of money (i.e.,
interest group pressures)."); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress:
Lavished By Campaign Cash, Lawmakers Are "Reforming" Bankruptcy-Punishing the
Downtrodden to Catch a Few Cheats, TiME, May 15, 2000, at 64 ("The Bankruptcy Reform
Act is typical of legislation that Congress writes for the benefit of special-interest groups that
are hefty campaign contributors-at the expense of ordinary Americans who contribute
nothing.").
22 See Stephen Labaton, Senate Reject Efforts to Alter Bankruptcy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2005, at C4 (detailing rejected amendments in the Senate and noting that Republican
senators "were instructed by the leadership to oppose all amendments").
23 The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to pass uniform laws of bank-
ruptcy. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This requirement generally has been interpreted to
mean geographical uniformity. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy § 1.6
(1997).
24 419 U.S. 102 (1974). I am indebted to my colleague, Tuan Samahon, for drawing this
case to my attention and suggesting the geographical uniformity requirement might allow for
some regional flexibility in an emergency.
25 Id. at 158-59 (quoting Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440,
463 n.7 (1937), and In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 915 (Reg'l Rail Reorg
Ct. 1974)) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
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Under this reasoning, a court might consider the conditions caused by a natural
disaster similar in scope to Hurricane Katrina the type of regional emergency
that Congress may remedy by a geographically focused amendment to the
bankruptcy laws.
A change in the bankruptcy laws only for victims of a particular natural
disaster has two drawbacks. First, despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Blanchette, the precise scope of the uniformity requirement is unclear, and
any regional law runs the risk that a court would find it unconstitutional. Sec-
ond, a change for victims of a particular natural disaster provides no assistance
for victims of other natural disasters who may lack political clout.
A more permanent and less constitutionally risky solution would be to
except victims of all natural disasters from the BAPCPA provisions that make
the least sense for victims of a natural disaster and most restrict access to the
bankruptcy courts. For example, section 102 of BAPCPA imposes a new
"means test" that will test whether a debtor has an income over the state median
for households of the debtor's size.26 If so, the debtor generally has to file for
chapter 13 bankruptcy if the debtor can afford to pay back $100 per month to
creditors. A debtor can rebut the presumption of the means test by showing
special circumstances "such as a serious medical condition or call or order to
active duty in the Armed Forces."2 7 Although we lack experience with what
the courts will do with the special circumstances exception, the statutory lan-
guage appears to call for a very strong evidentiary showing from the debtor.
To qualify for the exception, the debtor must itemize additional items of
income or expense, provide documentation, make an attestation under oath, and
explain in detail the special circumstances.2 8 It makes little sense to subject
victims of a natural disaster to a means test to ensure they truly need bank-
ruptcy. Moreover, victims of a natural disaster often will have lost the docu-
ments necessary to a claim of special circumstances. Congress excepted
disabled veterans from the means test 29 and a similar exception should be made
for natural disaster victims.
Similarly, it makes little sense to force victims of a natural disaster to
undergo consumer credit counseling before filing bankruptcy to ensure they
understand how to use credit.30 Good advice might be to stay out of the path of
a hurricane, as if such an event were in debtors' control. Although courts can
exempt debtors from this new requirement of credit counseling before bank-
ruptcy, this exemption can last only forty-five days.3 1 Military members on
active service and persons with physical or mental disabilities can be perma-
nently exempted.3 2 Victims of natural disasters should be added to these
exceptions and also be eligible for permanent exemptions.
Another provision of BAPCPA requires courts to dismiss cases for debtors
who fail to produce old tax returns, payment advices, and other financial
26 BAPCPA § 102, 119 Stat. 23, 27-31 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
27 Id. § 102, 119 Stat. at 29 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i)).
28 Id. (adding 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
29 Id. (adding 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D)).
30 See id. § 106, 119 Stat. at 37-38 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 109).
31 Id. § 106, 119 Stat. at 37 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B)).
32 Id. (adding 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4)).
Fall 2005]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
records at the time of filing.33 Failure to file these records results in automatic
dismissal of individual debtors' bankruptcy case after forty-five days.3 4 An
uncodified provision of BAPCPA provides that a bankruptcy court is not to
grant a discharge in chapter 7 or confirm chapter 11 or 13 plans (the precursor
to the discharge) for individuals who fail to provide requested tax records.35
Although BAPCPA says the bankruptcy courts can except debtors from pro-
ducing some tax returns for "circumstances beyond the control of the debtor,"
this exception does not apply to the uncodified provision denying discharge or
confirmation to debtors who fail to produce tax records.3 6 Victims of a natural
disaster are likely to have lost many personal financial records and should be
excepted from these new requirements of having to produce documents lost in a
natural disaster.
BAPCPA also imposes new requirements on consumer bankruptcy attor-
neys, requiring them to certify that they "performed a reasonable investigation
into the circumstances that gave rise" to their clients' bankruptcy petitions.37
Because many victims of natural disasters will have lost evidence to document
their financial circumstances, attorneys may find it difficult to make this certifi-
cation for a debtor who has been through a natural disaster. The result will be
that victims of natural disaster will be unable to find counsel or, perhaps even
worse, able to find only counsel willing to sign a certification based on flimsy
or nonexistent documentation. Again, an exception should be made to this cer-
tification requirement for victims of natural disasters who have lost paperwork.
The difficulty in excepting victims of natural disasters from certain
BAPCPA provisions would be in designing the scope of any exception. To
reach those who have suffered property loss as well as those who have suffered
income disruption, the exception should have both a residence-based and
employment-based component. Debtors who reside or work within a region in
which a federally declared disaster has occurred could claim eligibility for the
exceptions if they suffered an asset loss or income disruption material to their
financial circumstances. The usual rules against frivolous pleadings and false
statements of fact would deter fraudulent claims of exceptions. Parties in inter-
est would have the opportunity to object and establish that the debtor had not
suffered a material asset loss or income disruption.
Because the increased bankruptcy filings after a natural disaster are only
symptoms of financial distress, other measures could also be taken to prevent
the financial distress from occurring or, at least, worsening. The Ser-
vicemembers Civil Relief Act protects members of the military from adverse
personal financial consequences sterming from their military service38 and
could serve as a model for the types of protection that might be made available
to natural disaster victims. However, natural disaster victims have their own
33 Id. § 315(b), 119 Stat. at 89-91 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 521(a), (c)-(h)).
14 Id. § 315(b), 119 Stat. at 90-91 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 521(f)).
3- Id. § 1228, 119 Stat. at 200.
36 Id. § 315(b), 119 Stat. at 90 (amending 11 U.S C. § 521(e)(2)(B)). The language
allowing a bankruptcy court to excuse a debtor from producing income tax returns refers
only to § 521(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and makes no reference to the uncodified
provision mentioned in the text.
37 Id. § 102, 119 Stat. at 30 (adding II U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(C)).
31 See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-529 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
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set of special problems that need addressing. In addition to ensuring that bank-
ruptcy is available for those whose economic circumstances continue to deteri-
orate, it would be helpful for many more families if some of the economic
pressure could be alleviated so that they might have a chance to survive without
filing for bankruptcy.
For creditors dealing with borrowers having a billing address in an
affected disaster area, there should be temporary moratoria of 90 or 120 days
on adverse credit actions. During this same time, credit card companies and
other consumer lenders should not be able to impose late fees, penalty default
interest rates, universal default interest rates, or any other penalty for late pay-
ments. Creditors should not be able to institute proceedings or take default
judgments in proceedings already underway. Also, there should be a temporary
bar on creditors reporting debts as uncollectible to credit reporting agencies.
Natural disaster victims also need laws that would provide more perma-
nent protections. For example, within days of the Hurricane Katrina disaster,
some lenders' web sites stated that the lenders flatly refused to accept loan
applications from Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama.39 Regardless of their
creditworthiness or whether they were even affected .by the hurricane, borrow-
ers in these states could not turn to these lenders. Someone who was
creditworthy would be unable to buy a car on credit to replace one that had
been swept away in the storm. This kind of credit restriction intensifies the
economic fallout from natural disaster. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
which bars certain forms of discrimination in lending,4 ° should be amended to
bar the denial of credit solely because of a person's residence or employment
within a federal disaster area.
Another model for relief comes from the farm crisis of the 1980s, during
which many states passed laws requiring mandatory mediation before a lender
could foreclose on a family farm. Often, these statutes imposed a stay of court
proceedings during the mediation.4 The purpose was to give borrower and
lender a chance to work out a mutually acceptable repayment plan that avoided
bankruptcy. Real estate foreclosures were the primary concern in the family
farm crisis, but in the natural disaster setting, mediation could be extended to
any debt collection efforts. After the expiration of any temporary moratoria on
debt collection, mandatory mediation statutes with court stays would give natu-
ral disaster victims and their creditors time to search for mutually beneficial
solutions that avoid bankruptcy court.
Another major problem for natural disaster victims is the large amounts of
debt that might be secured by an asset that has been destroyed. After the natu-
ral disaster, the victim not only has to buy a new house or new car but must
continue paying for the old house or car that sits under a pile of rubble or in six
39 Ameriquest Mortgage, Loans: Request a Loan Online (on file with author), https://ameri
questmortgage.com/loan.html;jsessionid=DeikOUKn91A4XrgLUY I djFfo3PqX9N2NcqJDD
DH4MhEctF9glMpk!-1676169870?#anchor (last visited Sept. 1, 2005); Netbank, Auto Loan
States at Netbank (on file with author), http://www.netbank.com/loans-autostate.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2005).
40 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2000).
41 See Robert M. Lawless, Note, The American Response to Farm Crises: Procedural
Debtor Relief, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1050-55 (describing these statutes).
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feet of water.4" BAPCPA exacerbates the problem for individual chapter 7 or
chapter 13 debtors who now must pay secured creditors the retail value of any
collateral,4 3 a value that can exceed any insurance recovery. Federal law could
ban deficiency judgments for home or automobile loans when the collateral has
been destroyed in a federally declared natural disaster and provide that the
value of any secured claim in bankruptcy shall not exceed the value of any
insurance recovery on collateral that has been destroyed. To be eligible for
such protections, however, the debtor must have maintained all insurance
required by the loan agreement and tendered the insurance payment to the
lender. If the debtor informs the lender that she is awaiting an insurance pay-
ment under these circumstances, federal law additionally should ban any judi-
cial proceedings to collect the debt.
Other statutory enactments would be necessary to make these suggested
relief provisions effective. The law would have to ban adverse credit reporting
for natural disaster victims who exercise their rights to debt relief. Similarly,
creditors should not be allowed to pursue codebtors for unpaid debts stemming
from debt relief due to a natural disaster. Federal courts would have to be
empowered to enforce any rights to debt relief, including the stay of state court
proceedings, and debtors would not be able to waive judicial enforcement of
their rights. Finally, given the prevalence of form adhesion contracts in the
consumer lending industry, a debtor should not be able to waive any rights to
debt relief in the wake of a natural disaster.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even with blunt statistical tools and few observations, the data in this Arti-
cle revealed a distinct pattern. Bankruptcy filings tend to rise in the period
twelve to thirty-six months after a major hurricane. When hurricanes have
struck in the past, victims turned to the bankruptcy courts for help. So that
natural disaster victims will continue to have this assistance, exceptions need to
be made to recent legislation that would restrict access to bankruptcy's fresh
start. Bankruptcy is only a symptom of underlying financial distress, and this
Article also offered a number of other measures that could be taken to alleviate
the financial devastation visited upon victims of natural disasters. In the imme-
diate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, this Article has tried to give some sugges-
tions to improve the lot of its victims as well as victims of future natural
disasters. In the longer term, bankruptcy and consumer law scholars should
consider what other changes need to be made so the existing legal framework
does not impose further hardships on those already devastated by natural
disasters.
42 Such a story is told in Evan Halper, A Fresh Calamity?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at
KI, where a home was heavily damaged in a landslide. The owner had to find the financial
resources to secure temporary shelter, pay for repairs to the extent insurance was deficient,
and pay the mortgage on the damaged home.
41 See BAPCPA § 327, 119 Stat. at 99-100 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)).
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